COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"They [the Doctor and his colleagues] are not only not new to the House and the Public, but they "are not new to the love and esteem of the House and the Public, and that from *sufficient experience* "as to their principles and talents. One of them [the Doctor himself] is a gentleman, who is admired in private, as well as respected and esteemed in public, and who has been long chosen into "the situation of first Commoner in this country. Is *this* the person, of whom the House of Commons are to say that they will not confide in him, because, at a moment of difficulty, he quitted "a situation of the highest authority that a representative of the people can possess, for one of "greater trouble and perplexity? To *refuse confidence* to such a person, in such a situation, appears "to me to be *repugnant to common sense* and *common justice.*"——Mr. Pitt's Speech, March 25, 1801.

449] [450

AN ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW

Of two pamphlets, lately published, the one entitled, "Cursory Remarks upon the State of Parties, during the administration of Mr. Addington, by a NEAR OBSERVER;" *and the other entitled, "A Plain Answer to the misrepresentations and calumnies contained in the Cursory Remarks of a Near Observer, by* A MORE ACCURATE OBSERVER."

(Concluded from p. 343.)

Mr. Pitt's conduct in Parliament after his retiring from office, to the night of Mr. Patten's motion inclusive.

During the remaining part of the session of Parliament, which was far advanced at the time when Mr. Pitt ceased to be minister, it is well known that he gave the new ministers his unqualified support. The next session opened with the discussions on the preliminary treaty with France and the convention with Russia, of both which measures he expressed his perfect approbation, and, indeed, there is little doubt of his having been consulted, in every stage of the negotiation of both those compacts. The Parliament, during the winter of 1802, was seldom honoured with his presence; but, he appeared in his place, while the discussions on the Definitive Treaty were going on; and, when the final question, relative thereto, was put, he sealed his approbation by his vote in favour of the ministers. After this he disappeared for the rest of the session, which closed with the month of June. The summer of 1802, was spent by the members of Parliament in attending to their elections; the ministers in reducing the army and navy, and in surrendering our conquests; and, by the Consul of France in augmenting his army and navy, in making new conquests, and in answering, with suitable disdain, the unmeaning attempts made by ministers to crawl into his good graces. The new-modelling of the German Empire, the annexing of Piedmont to the republic of France, the renewed and direct interference, on the part of the Consul, in the affairs of Holland, and the still more direct and more violent interference in the affairs of Switzerland, had all taken place previous to the meeting of Parliament, at which time, too, it was clearly understood, that the ministers, after having long wavered between resistance and submission, after having dispatched, to the conquered colonies, orders and counter-orders, and counter-counter-orders, had, finally resolved to yield up every thing but Malta, which was only retained because the mode of surrender could not be satisfactorily adjusted; but which, it was, by some persons, apprehended, would prove a new cause of hostility. Such was the state of things when Parliament met, on the 23d of November, 1802. Mr. Pitt never made his appearance in the House of Commons till the 23d of the ensuing month of May, when he came down to defend the ministers upon the question of an address to his Majesty, in consequence of his message and declaration relative to the war with France. In the previous part of the session much business had been done, many important subjects had been discussed, and several laws, deeply affecting the interests of the public weal, had been passed: yet, Mr. Pitt appeared not: even the message of the 8th of March, announcing the hostile preparations of France, and the prospect of a speedy rupture, was not sufficient to bring him to Parliament. On the 23d of May, he gave his cordial support to the address, in a long and animated speech; which speech, however, breathed very little friendship for the ministers; but, on the contrary, seemed studiously to avoid every topic of praise, and even to prepare the way for that negative kind of censure, which he passed on their conduct, on the 3d of June, when he moved the previous question upon the motion for positive censure, proposed by Mr. Patten. It was on that day

that he openly broke with the ministers: from that day they appear to have numbered him amongst their enemies: and, accordingly, from that day, their partisan, the Near Observer, seems to have received instructions to commence the work of retaliation.

The charge of the Near Observer against Mr. Pitt is made in a very irregular way; we find its parts scattered from one end to the other of the pamphlet; it is a skirmishing, bush-fighting sort of warfare; but, the substance of all the parts collected together, may be expressed in one sentence, thus: 'That Mr. Pitt recommended the present 'ministers to the King, and prevailed upon 'them to accept of their places; but, that 'previously to their doing so, he promised 'them his *constant support*; that he did 'support them, up to the day, when the 'memorable negotiation for his return to 'power was broken off; but, that, from 'that time forward, from the time when 'Mr. Addington refused to surrender at 'discretion, Mr. Pitt commenced a most 'foul and rancorous opposition; and, in the 'course of that opposition, showed himself 'to be "selfish, malignant, profligate, cor-'"rupt, unprincipled, and perfidious."'— Hard words, to be sure; and, certainly, if applied without qualification, very unjustly applied to Mr. Pitt; but, since they have been applied to him, one cannot help being pleased to hear them proceed from the mouths of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys, from the mouths of those, whom he had cherished, only, because they were little and low; only because they suited him as instruments, whereby to keep from all participation in power those persons of whose talents and whose influence, he was jealous.

That Mr. Pitt did, on the 3d of June last, in moving the previous question upon Mr. Patten's motion, commence an opposition against the ministers is certain; nor can it be denied, that he has continued that opposition ever since. The question to be decided, therefore, appears to be this: whether his opposition arose from that pure sense of public duty, by which he professed, and still professes, to be actuated; or, from the motive, to which it is ascribed by the hireling of the Treasury, that is, malice against Mr. Addington for refusing to give him carte blanche in surrendering the government into his hands. This is the question, upon which those who wish duly to estimate the conduct of Mr. Pitt have to decide. It has, by Mr. Bentley, by Mr. Long, by Mr. Ward, and by several others, been so entangled with circumstances, so choaked up with digressions of censure on one side and of panegyric on the other, that, after having read their productions, we really lose sight of it altogether; and, in order to arrive at any thing like a rational conclusion, are obliged to return to the point whence we first started on the inquiry. Here, then, confining our view to the main point before us, we hear the Near Observer, charging Mr. Pitt with having commenced an opposition out of revenge, which revenge arose from his not being able to re-possess himself of his former place upon his own terms. This is the charge, unequivocally alleged, and maintained by a show, at least, of fact and argument; but, receiving much greater support from the internal evidence afforded by the circumstances of the case: for, if we know that a man has been in negotiation for a place in the cabinet, if we know that the negotiation has broken off on account of a disagreement as to the terms, if we know that before the negotiation he never openly disapproved of the measures of ministers, and if we hear him openly disapprove of those very same measures after the negotiation, do we not fairly, do we not naturally, nay, do we not almost necessarily, conclude, that his opposition arises from his disappointment? Every man of common sense and common sincerity, to whom this question is put, will, without hesitation, answer, yes. Mr. Pitt and his partisans seem to have been fully aware of the truth and the force of this observation; and, accordingly, the two writers who alone are, in this respect, worthy of notice, have endeavoured to point out "motives for his conduct more "probable than those of mortification and "disappointment." But, the zeal of Mr. Long and Mr. Ward, though the former had, doubtless, all the aid which Mr. Pitt himself could afford him, has been insufficient for the purpose. The internal evidence of the case is too strong; it is of too simple and too convincing a nature to be overset, to be shaken, or even to be, in the slightest degree, affected, by any thing short of well-established facts, instead of which we find, in the writings here spoken of, a reliance upon hints, conjectures, and insinuations, and some of these stated with so much reserve and obscurity, that we are compelled to guess at the literal meaning of the writer, as well as at the object of his allusions. Let us hear Mr. Long's list of justificatory reasons. "It will not be difficult to suggest "motives for Mr. Pitt's conduct *more pro-*"*bable* than mortification and disappoint-"ment. A person, not blinded like the "Near Observer, by his aversion to the "late minister, may, perhaps, think that it "is *just possible*, that some difference of opi-

nion with Mr. Addington upon the gene-
ral subject of finance; that some differ-
ence as to the management of our foreign
affairs; that some difference in particular
as to the conduct of ministers in the ne-
gotiation with France, may have operated
on Mr. Pitt's mind. He may have
thought the representation of our finan-
cial resources on the 10th of December
last, was not perfectly correct; though
afterwards he may have thought it of little
avail to revise or to comment upon a
statement made in contemplation of peace,
when war had been declared. He may
have thought that the necessary steps to
conciliate foreign powers had been omit-
ted, that alliances had been neglected.
He may have thought that though the
hostile spirit of the First Consul of France
was sufficiently manifest, yet that from
the treaty of Amiens to the breaking out
of the war, that spirit had been met in a
manner more likely to invite and encou-
rage, than to counteract and resist it. He
may have communicated these opinions,
or at least some of them, to his Majesty's
ministers, and he may have found that
they were either rejected as ill founded,
or unattended to altogether."——To this
Mr. Ward has added nothing, except *words*.
He has taken up precisely the same sugges-
tions, and has given to them that cumbrous
amplification, which, together with an af-
fectation of dignity in the manner and of
candour in the sentiment, illustrated occa-
sionally by far-fetched similies expressed in
new-fangled phrases, constitute that which,
in the frivolous cant of the day, is denomi-
nated the "gentlemanly style." But, does
Mr. Long think, that mere suggestions, and
does Mr. Ward think, that mere words are
sufficient to resist the potent circumstances,
the strong circumstantial evidence, to which
they are here opposed? We know that Mr.
Pitt never openly expressed his disapproba-
tion of any of the measures of Mr. Adding-
ton, before the latter refused to admit him
into the cabinet upon his own terms; and
we also know, that *after* that refusal, he
commenced an open opposition, grounded
upon the measures which Mr. Addington
had adopted previous to the refusal. These
are facts; this is presumptive proof; and is
it to be met by "probabilities?" Are we
to disbelieve our own senses; are we, at
once, to abandon all the principles, accord-
ing to which we have been accustomed to
judge, because Mr. Pitt is the defendant?
Is there one law, one moral and politic code
for him, and another for other men? And,
if there is not, let me ask Mr. Long or Mr.
Ward, what would, under circumstances si-
milar to those of this case, have been their
decision, with respect to the conduct of any
other man? Would they have considered
mere suggestions, mere probabilities, as form-
ing a satisfactory answer to a charge founded
upon circumstances so convincing?

But, supposing Mr. Long's suggestions to
be, in reality, *assertions*. Suppose, that he
means to say, and ought to be understood as
saying, that "a difference of opinion with
Mr. Addington," upon several subjects, *posi-
tively did* "operate on the mind of Mr.
Pitt;" suppose Mr. Long to mean, not that
Mr. Pitt "*may* have" disapproved of such
or such a part of the conduct of ministers,
but that he *positively did* disapprove of that
conduct. Having adopted this supposition,
let us, then, inquire a little into the nature
of the subjects, upon which Mr. Pitt differed
in opinion with Mr. Addington, and disco-
ver, if we can, what were the grounds of
this difference: because, if we should find,
that the subjects are of an unimportant nature,
or that the disapprobation of Mr. Pitt was
unreasonable and unjust, we shall by no
means be inclined to admit, that his enter-
taining such disapprobation is a proof of his
not having commenced an opposition from
motives of mortification and disappointment.
——Mr. Long deals so much in general
terms, that one can hardly fix upon any
thing that he says. It is, however, pretty
clear, that he wishes to have it understood,
that Mr. Pitt differed in opinion with Mr.
Addington upon subjects of finance gene-
rally, and that he particularly disapproved
of the Doctor's "representation of our finan-
cial resources on the 10th of December,
1802." As to the *general* subject of fi-
nance, it is impossible for us to know, or
even to guess at, what were the grounds of
Mr. Pitt's disapprobation; nor, indeed, would
it be very easy to conceive how it was possi-
ble for any grounds of this sort to exist, see-
ing that, up to the end of the session of Par-
liament which closed in June, 1802, Mr.
Pitt not only approved of, but openly sup-
ported, every one of Mr. Addington's mea-
sures of finance; and, I know of no finan-
cial measure whatever that was adopted be-
tween that time and the evening of Mr. Pat-
ten's motion. "The representation of the
10th of December, 1802," is particularly
mentioned, by Mr. Long, as being disap-
proved of by Mr. Pitt. But, though that re-
presentation was certainly fallacious, though
it was proved to be so at the time, though it
showed the vanity and incapacity of the
Doctor, yet, it cannot be regarded as a car-
dinal political sin, a sin of so heinous a

a nature as to make a man's dearest friends shun him, as if he were infected with the plague; not certainly a sin of a magnitude to induce members of Parliament to desert a minister. The Doctor over-rated his means: he estimated the surplus of the Consolidated fund at 7,800,000l. and actually inserted it at 6,500,000l. whereas, as it was then foretold, and as it has now been proved by experience, he should have estimated it at between 4 and 5 millions. But, was it fair for Mr. Pitt to desert a minister, and a minister who depended on him too, for a cause like this? Was it for Mr. Pitt to resent so deeply the making of an over-estimate? Was it for Mr. Pitt, above all men living, to punish so severely the crime of playing off a financial deception? The Doctor's fallacious statement was, it is true, published in a pamphlet, at the expense of the public, and transmitted to our ministers at all the foreign courts: and was not the fallacious pamphlet of George Rose published and circulated in the same manner? The Doctor's receipts have fallen short of his calculations; and did not Mr. Pitt's receipts frequently fall short of his calculations? And, were he to return to office, aided by his trusty Empson and Dudley, would not his receipts still fall short of his calculations? Does it not, then, require an uncommon degree of hardihood for Mr. Long to hold forth the incorrectness of the December statement as a reason for Mr. Pitt's opposing the Doctor at all, and especially for commencing, on that account, an opposition, which had been delayed till six months after that statement was made?

The next subject of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation of the measures of ministers, is, their mismanagement of our foreign affairs, and particular mention is made of their having neglected to form continental alliances. How much any ministry, in any period of our history, could have done in this way, in the space of eight or nine months, Mr. Long has not told us: indeed, it was impossible that he should; but, it was, "under existing "circumstances," his duty to endeavour, at least, to show, that there was a *possibility* of obtaining a hearing, upon such a subject, in any one court of Europe, after the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, that treaty in which Britain basely abandoned her most faithful allies, and prostrated herself to the earth before her rival: it was Mr. Long's duty to show, not that there existed the means, not that there was a likelihood (that would be asking too much of him), but it was his duty to show, that there was a *possibility* of forming continental alliances, in nine months after the disgrace and infamy of Britain had been signed and sealed in that treaty, to which Mr. Pitt gave his unequivocal approbation and support. I know, that there prevails, with Mr. Pitt and his defenders, a strong desire to inculcate a belief, that he did not *entirely* approve of the peace with France, nor of the convention with Russia: Mr. Long, every where, carefully avoids an avowal that Mr. Pitt did give to those measures, or either of them, his decided approbation; and, in one place, he speaks of "all "the *qualifications* which accompanied Mr. "Pitt's approval of the treaty of Amiens." But, where? will he be so good as to tell us, *where* we are to look, to what speech, or what action of Mr. Pitt we are to refer, for a sign of *all* these qualifications, or any one of them? At the very first appearance of the preliminary treaty of peace, Mr. Pitt declared, that it "afforded matter of joy "and *exultation* to the country, and entitled "the government" [that is the ministers] "to its warmest approbation, and *most* "*grateful thanks*." When that treaty came to be discussed, he made a long and elaborate defence of it, interlarded with occasional sarcasms upon those by whom it was thought to be of an injurious and dangerous tendency. During all the discussions on the definitive treaty, he never opened his lips but for the purpose of approving of that compact, or of thwarting and attacking the persons who disapproved of it; and, at the close of the first day's debate upon the address proposed by the New Opposition, he rose to oppose an adjournment, because he was "ready to vote for the amended ad-"dress, being *perfectly satisfied* with the ar-"guments so ably and *successfully* urged by "his noble friend, Lord Hawkesbury." Where, then, as it was once before asked, where are we to look for "all the qualifi-"cations," with which Mr. Pitt gave his approval to the treaty of Amiens? And, where, too, I again ask, are we to look for an apology for those, who *now* endeavour to make the world believe in the existence of such qualifications? It is not necessary for me to say, that I have no partiality for the miserable inefficient creatures, with whom Mr. Pitt found it convenient to fill up the offices of the state; but, I have a partiality for truth and fair play, and certain I am, that every honourable man will agree with me, that nothing ever was more foul than for Mr. Pitt *now* to attempt to get rid of the share of that shame which is due to the makers and advisers of the peace; and, at the same time, to blame his associates for not having since accomplished that, which, as was repeatedly foretold at the time, the

peace itself must necessarily render them unable to accomplish.

The third ground of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation is stated to be, the manner in which the last negotiation of France was conducted. We are told by Mr. Long, that the ministers exhibited a want of firmness; that they should have transported those "accredited spies," the French military commissaries, with indignation, from our shores. Several other instances of pusillanimity are pointed out; and, indeed, the readers of the Register and of the Parliamentary Debates, will find that these instances were all pointed out, and commented on, with just severity, more than *eight months before* Mr. Pitt thought proper to let the world know that they had attracted his attention; and, if they were not of importance enough to bring him down to the Parliament for a day or two, though he was in town, and was *ready to become minister* in the earlier part of the session, will any one allow, that it is fair to urge them as a ground of that opposition, which he commenced in the month of June, against the very men, in conjunction with whom, provided his own terms were acceded to, he was ready to re-enter the cabinet? But, the main objection, we are told, that Mr. Pitt had to the conduct of ministers, with respect to France, was, their having *delayed too long* the opening of negotiations for an arrangement with regard to Malta; and we are even given to understand, that he, from the first, disapproved of the part of the treaty which related to that island. Upon this point let us hear both his defenders. "Without entering," says Mr. Long, "into the merits of the peace "of Amiens, it was not difficult to perceive, at a *very early period*, that it could only be preserved by a firm, manly, and uniform system. We should not, in the first instance, have entered into stipulations respecting the future state and government of the island of Malta, without the full authority and consent of those powers upon whom the execution of those stipulations depended; but, in every point of view, we should have adjusted the final settlement of that island, the only difficult point the negotiation presented, *with our conquests in our hands*. We should have insisted that the restitution of those conquests should have been accompanied on the part of France with pacific dispositions and pacific measures. In no case should our conduct have been submissive. If we had manifested this determination *at the beginning*, and acted upon it throughout; if we had adopted "that system of precaution and firmness so "strenuously *recommended by Mr. Pitt*, and "upon which, in the discussion of the pre-"liminaries of peace, he represented our "security to depend—who is there who can "say *the war might not have been avoided?*" ——Mr. Ward, after stating those obstacles to the execution of the article respecting Malta, which, so early as the month of March, 1802, were stated in the Political Register, and which were, much more minutely and with infinitely greater ability and effect, displayed by Lord Grenville in his speech on the definitive treaty, proceeds thus: "Yet these glaring defects in the "most important stipulation of the whole "arrangement; that upon which France "was known to be most obstinate, most irritable, and most ready to quarrel; that "upon which, finally, she has quarrelled; "they signed the treaty, knowing it could "not be executed, as a man signs a bond "which he knows will lodge him in a "gaol. Even this might possibly have "with prudence been repaired, had they "been more intent upon the duration of "the peace, than the temporary importance of having achieved it. Had they "applied themselves with fidelity and zeal "to the correction of their errors, and "frankly avowed the original obstacles; "had they set themselves to work ON THE "INSTANT *with their antagonist, animated with "an equal love of peace on his side; it is possible they might have new modelled the article, "and all might yet have been well.* But no; "they dreaded all farther altercation; they "dared not hazard the reputation they had "acquired; their advantage was immediate, the danger contingent. The consequence was what might be expected; "the dreadful mine has since exploded!" —Now, as to the signing of the article relative to Malta, which act Mr. Ward, in another place, ascribes to "*infatuation* be-"yond all mental power to conceive;" we may surely ask, whether he who defended and applauded the treaty must not also have laboured under infatuation, unfortunate in any man, but peculiarly so in a second "Camillus," another "Cato," he who is "to save the city and restore the "tottering state?" Am I told, that there were circumstances regarding Malta, obstacles to the fulfilment of the article, which the ministers hid from Mr. Pitt? My answer is, that they could not hide them from Lord Grenville: his lordship saw them all, and, if Mr. Pitt had not the advantage of timely information from that quarter, he had similar information from Mr. Windham, in

his place in the House of Commons. So that, there is no refuge here: either he saw the obstacles, or he wanted penetration and judgment; or, as Mr. Ward has it, he laboured under "infatuation beyond all mental power to conceive." But, it is to the *remedy*, which we are desired to believe Mr. Pitt would have employed, and which he disapproved of the ministers for not employing, that I wish to direct the reader's attention. This remedy was, we are now told by his partisans, "a firm, manly, and "uniform conduct; a system of precaution "and firmness; no surrender of conquests "till we had finally adjusted and settled "the difficult points in the arrangement; "the ministers should have set themselves "to work *on the instant*;" and, if they had thus acted, "all might yet have been well," says Mr. Ward, and "who is there that can say," asks Mr. Long, "that the war might not have been avoided?" And was not this remedy prescribed by the New Opposition, in their proposed address of the 13th of May, 1802? Did they not, in that memorable, that prophetic address to their Sovereign, expressly state their apprehensions from "the numerous subjects of clashing interest "and *unavoidable dispute*, which the treaty "had left entirely unadjusted;" and did they not, as "a necessary consequence of "their sincere wish for the permanence of "the public tranquillity, earnestly recommend to his Majesty's wisdom the *pressing* necessity of arranging, by *immediate "and amicable discussion*, those points of "essential interests, for which no provision "had been made in this negotiation?" Did they not here prescribe the very remedy, which we are now requested to believe, that Mr. Pitt wished the ministers to adopt? Did not Mr. Pitt vote *against* their address; and did not his Caledonian colleague, with that truth and modesty for which he is so famous, ascribe it to "a *conspiracy for place?*" Was Mr. Pitt so "*perfectly satisfied*" of its impropriety, that he was willing to dispense with any additional information that might be derived from an adjournment of the discussion? And shall we now be told, that the non-adoption of this remedy is a valid ground for his opposition to ministers? Shall we tamely and silently listen to this unbearable affront to our understandings, merely because it is offered in the behalf of Mr. Pitt?

Thus, then, I think, the grounds of Mr. Pitt's pretended disapprobation of the measures of ministers sink from beneath him; and, as to the only efficient cause of his opposition of the 3d of June, 1803, we are naturally led back to the failure of the negotiation for place; to that "mortification and disappointment," than which Mr. Long tells us any person unblinded by passion might have suggested motives "more probable," but which motives, notwithstanding all the stimuli and all the advantages under which he must have written, he certainly has failed to suggest. Were we, however, to allow, that Mr. Pitt did disapprove of the measures of ministers, and that he had no act or part in producing that which was the object of his disapprobation, we naturally ask, how it came to pass, that that disapprobation was, for so long a space of time, confined to his own breast? The session of Parliament began in November, and he never made his appearance in the House till the latter end of May. If he did really differ in opinion with his protegé upon the general measures of finance, upon the mode of conducting our foreign affairs, and especially upon that in which the negotiation with France was conducted, why did he not come to the Parliament and say so? Why did he reserve the expression of his disapprobation, till it was too late, as to the purposes of preventing the evils he is said to have dreaded, to disapprove with any effect? If he thought that the ministers ought to have "set themselves to work *on the instant*," to adjust and settle the affairs relative to Malta, why did he not come and tell them so, on the 23d of November, while we were yet at peace, and while, too, there was, probably, yet time to retain some of our conquests, which were afterwards surrendered? If the deceptive financial statement of the 10th of December was of an importance sufficient to be now cited as a legitimate cause for commencing an opposition against the minister, whom he had thrusted into office, whom he had recommended to the Parliament, whom he had eulogized, to with-hold confidence from whom he had stigmatized as "repugnant to common sense and common justice;" if that statement was of a nature so momentous, why did he not appear in his place, at the time, or as soon after as might be, and correct it, seeing that his health permitted him to come to town during the Christmas recess, and seeing that by the month of March he was stout enough to encounter the toils attached to the office of prime minister? Before he joins in the clamours of the Jews and the Jew-like citizens, who were duped by the fallacious statement, let him satisfactorily account for his not having imitated Lord Grenville in exposing the fallacy, while yet there was time, in spite of all the efforts of the Treasury hirelings to

stigmatize him as endeavouring "to decry the resources of the country and encourage the hopes of the enemy." *Then* was the time for him to speak, and not having spoken then, it is excessively mean to join in what is now become the popular cry, but what was, at that time, unpopular.——But, though he did not come to Parliament, though he disguised from the public, from his sovereign and his constituents, the disapprobation he entertained of the measures of ministers, he did, we are told, freely and distinctly express that disapprobation *in private*. Mr. Long tells us, that "he may "have communicated his opinions to the "ministers, or at least some of them, and "he may have found, that they were either "rejected as ill-founded, or unattended to "altogether." And Mr. Ward, who is more *full* upon this part of the subject, as, indeed, he is upon most others, obligingly, gives us the following curious information: "I repeat it, and it cannot be too often "impressed upon the world, that from the "*winding up* of the peace of Amiens, no "full or fair communication concerning fo-"reign affairs was made to him, so as to "draw from him the full benefit of his "advice, an advice which *was ever ready* "when frankly desired. Partial communi-"cations may indeed sometimes have been "made; and opinions hastily obtained may "have been half acted upon, and then "thrown aside. The warmth that he may "once or twice have kindled, may have "been even kept glowing, until it reached "the Continent: but there it was sure to "be marred, dissipated, frozen, and lost. It "becomes me not to mention particulars "which I have no authority to detail; but "if this be true, it accounts for the strange "vicissitudes of hot and cold; the orders "and counter-orders; the rashness and "submission, "Like the poor cat i'the "adage, letting I dare not, wait upon I "would," that mark the memorable sum-"mer of 1802. However this may be, I "aver, that after the treaty of Amiens, Mr. "Pitt's last care of those who were now to "shew that they could stand alone, was "confined almost exclusively to plans of "finance. For this he laboured by *night "and by day*; for this he *sacrificed* his *lei-"sure* and his health; and for this he met "with the same return that attended most "of his other labours, little gratitude, an "attempt to change them, their unskilful "execution, and their consequent loss."—So then, it appears, that Mr. Pitt was still generous enough to lend his assistance in managing the affairs of the nation? It appears that he still was, in some degree, at any rate, consulted and obeyed? Without stopping here to exhibit in their full view the natural consequences of such an unconstitutional influence, such a clandestine mode of conducting the government, of ruling both king and people without even the chance of incurring responsibility; without giving way to the fullness of our indignation, we must all concur in rejoicing that the juggle, by which we and our sovereign were to be handed backward and forward from the Pitts to the Addingtons, and from the Addingtons to the Pitts, the one just keeping us in tow till the other had refitted and were ready to receive us; we must all, whatever be our politics or our party, unless we were to be sharers in the seizure; we must all rejoice, that this juggle, which Mr. Dundas might well and truly have called "a conspiracy for place;" yes, we must all most heartily rejoice, that this detestable juggle has been blown into air, and that, too, by the very means which were intended to secure its duration, by that very negotiation which was set on foot for the purpose of bringing Mr. Pitt back to take his turn at the helm. This leads us to the point of the question, here we come to the conclusion of our inquiry, and here we find Mr. Pitt ready and willing, provided his terms were acceded to, to enter the cabinet, to join and to co-operate with the men, of the whole of whose principal measures, foreign and domestic, he disapproved, but the leaders of whom he was willing to keep in place and in power, upon condition that he participated with them; and, not being able to obtain the share that he coveted, we find him seizing on the first opportunity that offered for commencing against them an opposition of the kind best calculated to render them contemptible and odious in the eyes of the world, and we see him restrained from open and violent hostility only by the fear of giving offence in that quarter where he wished to supplant them.

To those who have followed me through this long, and, I am afraid, tiresome discussion, it remains for me to apologize for having trespassed so much on their indulgence, and also for having so widely separated the several parts of this "Analytical and comparative View;" but, it was out of my power to be more brief, and when it is considered, that the pressing of this my own matter forward must have caused the exclusion of some of the productions of my correspondents, I am certain that the delay will be readily excused.

WM. COBBETT.

It may be useful to refer here to the several places, where the former topics of the "Analytical and comparative View" will be found.

I. The time, the manner, and the occasion, of the late ministry quitting their official situations, Vol. IV. p. 836.

II. The promise said to have been made by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, to give Mr. Addington their constant, active and zealous support. Vol. IV p. 897.

III. The circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt to office, Vol. IV. p. 903.

IV. The conduct of the New Opposition in Parliament. Lord Temple, Mr. Grenville, Dr. Laurence, Mr. Elliot, Vol. V. p. 1.—Mr. Canning, p. 65.—Lord Grenville, p. 97.—Mr. Windham, p. 321.

TO LORD REDESDALE.

MY LORD,——The high character which your lordship bears, in the estimation of the minister, your exalted rank, your distinguished situation, give a degree of importance, to opinions which would otherwise pass unnoticed and meet with deserved contempt. You are, from the place which you fill, by no means an indifferent man; your conduct and your sentiments must either excite praise, or provoke censure. This consideration should have been maturely weighed by your lordship, before you ventured to arraign the principles and the conduct of more than three millions of his Majesty's subjects. At a period like the present, when the very existence of this great empire is endangered, and Ireland is acknowledged to be the most vulnerable part, it is obvious what should be the conduct of an Irish Chancellor. It was expected by your friends, that the supposed mildness and gentleness of your temper would constantly induce you to support conciliating measures, and to pour balm into the wounds of the distracted country, in the government of which, you bear a distinguished part. But, unfortunately, you have disappointed the just expectations, both of friends, and of foes.——To say nothing of the indecency of reading lectures on loyalty to a respectable nobleman, in issuing, at his request, a commission of the peace; I must ask, my lord, what motives could have induced you to criminate, not only the religious principles of the Catholics of Ireland, and, consequently, of every Catholic in the world; but to fix a peculiar charge on the higher order of the clergy of this persuasion. Your lordship appears offended at the doctrine of exclusive salvation, as held by the Church of Rome; you consider it as the source of all the misfortunes of that distracted country, and as repugnant to the repose of mankind. For God's sake, my lord, read the 39 articles, the doctrine of which, you are solemnly pledged to support; examine particularly, the 8th and the 18th, weigh well the last words of the Athanasian Creed, and your lordship will find, that the exclusive doctrine is not peculiar to the Church of Rome; but, that it makes a part of the established religion of the land. By what fatality does it happen, my lord, that the charges, which you bring against the adherents of the See of Rome, fall with redoubled weight upon yourself? According to your lordship's representation of the case, they consider all who differ from them in religion, as guilty of defection and rebellion to the Roman See. And, my lord, do you not, as a rigid Protestant, look upon them as idolators? Have you not sworn, that they profess idolatry? Of course, then, that they can have no rational hope of future happiness? If the Protestant professes his religion, in defiance of the spiritual authority of the See of Rome; does not the Catholic, in your lordship's opinion, adhere to his faith in opposition to the laws of his country, and to the authority of his King, as the head of the united church? After this, I call upon your lordship, publicly to decide, whether the charge of rebellion, which, in your principles, you must bring against the adherents of the See of Rome; be not, at least, as serious as that, which you represent them as producing against all those, who differ from them in religious concerns.——But, my lord, your representation of the exclusive doctrine, as maintained by the Church of Rome, is extremely incorrect. However painful it may be to contradict a man of your lordship's high rank, and reputed knowledge, I must plainly tell you, that the adherents of the See of Rome *do not hold all* those, who differ from them in religion, as guilty of defection and rebellion. They say, that Christ has established but one church, and that truth is necessarily one; that all who *wilfully* and *obstinately* are separated from this church, to which they consider themselves as exclusively belonging, are not in the way of salvation. But, they do not deny, they even positively assert, that sincere believers in Christ, who by *invincible ignorance*, and *involuntary error*, are not members of their church, are not to be blamed for religious opinions, to which ignorance of this description has given birth. But when, and in what circumstances, this plea is to be admitted, they leave to the Great Judge. This

my lord, is the real representation of the case; it is what you might have learned from their Theologians, and other writers of every class, as well as from half an hour's conversation with the lowest of their clergy. If you do not possess this information, I have no opinion of your general knowledge; and, if you do, I have less of your liberality.—— Of as little weight, my lord, is your charge against Catholics of a total want of charity, in denying salvation to those who differ from them in religious belief. After what has been said, it is needless to observe, that this accusation can be retorted with advantage upon yourself, since, by your situation, you must necessarily maintain the same principle. Why could not your lordship give implicit credit to the declaration of Lord Fingall on this subject, when he assured you, that his religion enforced charity and brotherly love to all mankind, *without distinction of religion*; true and sincere allegiance to the King, and inviolable attachment to the constitution of the country. It appears, that, as you had lectured him on the duty of active and passive loyalty, you thought you might, with equal propriety, give him a few homilies on the pernicious tendency of his religious principles. The forbearance of that noble lord is entitled to respect and admiration. Had I been in his situation, I confess, I should not have possessed the same command of temper, when a Lord High Chancellor, ignorant of the fundamental articles of his own religion, should pretend to instruct me in mine.——It should not have escaped the attention of your lordship, that charity to all mankind, and submission to authority of every description, whatever be the religion of the rulers, are very prominent practices of the Catholic religion, and forcibly inculcated by Catholics throughout the world. If your lordship had taken the trouble to inspect a vulgar book, called the General Catechism, taught by the Catholic pastors in the very seat of his Majesty's government in Ireland, you would have seen, that the duties of universal charity, and of civil allegiance, are enforced in the most positive manner. To this little *contemptible* publication, particularly to lessons 14, 15, 17, and 19, I beg leave to refer your lordship.——The revolutions, my lord, which take place in the human mind, are often as wonderful as those, which are observed in the physical world. By what extraordinary occurrence, are we doomed to witness an astonishing change in the enlightened mind of your lordship? There was a time, my lord, when you felt and acknowledged the peaceable and loyal conduct of Catholics, and the innoxious tendency of their religious doctrines. You publicly espoused their cause in this country, with the utmost ardour; in their favour you displayed that zeal, which must ever arise in a liberal mind, on the view of unmerited oppression. The legislature and country adopted your sentiments; you were the mover of the bill, which gave the English Catholics a participation of some of the valuable privileges of the British constitution. After such a public avowal of your sentiments, nothing could exceed my astonishment on the appearance of the letters under consideration. No change of sentiment will, after such a singular proceeding, excite much wonder.

> Quis neget arduis
> Pronos relabi posse rivos,
> Montibus, et Tiberim reverti.

As the present ministers hold their situations by a resolute resistance of the Catholic claims, did your lordship think it necessary to co-operate in the *just* and *liberal* designs of your friends, to whom you are indebted for your present situation? And, could you not find a more plausible mode of attack, than that of misrepresenting and discrediting a religion, which once commanded your approbation and applause? Was it a proof of your judgment and consistency, to select, as an object of censure, that doctrine, which, as a protector of the established church, you are bound solemnly and officially to support?——Whatever motives may have led to this singular change in your lordship's sentiments, nothing can unquestionably be more fatal to the interests of the British empire, than the language and professions, which your letters convey. The unfortunate country, in which you hold a high situation, has been, for a considerable time, in a melancholy state; the wounds of a formidable rebellion are still green; a considerable degree of irritation is acknowledged to pervade the public mind; a ferocious enemy is preparing to invade our shores, and is believed to direct his ambitious views in a peculiar manner against Ireland. This is the moment, my lord, so full of danger and hazard, which you carefully and judiciously select for the purpose of criminating more than three millions of its inhabitants. Instead of exhorting all, without any distinction of religious belief, to rally round the throne, and the constitution of their country; instead of raising every arm in defence of the empire, in an hour of peril unexampled in our history; you employ the language of complaint and reproach; you thereby promote disunion and discord; you plainly tell the Catholics, that they are debarred from the

possibility of being loyal to a Protestant government; and, that they are to remain in a state of political excommunication, without hopes of farther relief. I really know not, my lord, what appellation to give to such conduct, but that of infatuation or phrenzy. As a British subject, warmly interested in the welfare of my country, I now call upon your lordship to disavow these pernicious sentiments, and to efface the impression which you have made. If, however, you persist in entertaining the same ideas, and supporting the illiberal measures of his Majesty's present ministers respecting Ireland, it requires but a small share of political sagacity to predict the consequences of your conduct. You will have the consolation to reflect, that, as you have taken measures directly tending to the ruin of your country, your plans will be crowned with ultimate success. May God grant, that you may not live to see the fatal catastrophe, to which your proceedings naturally lead; but, if you should, your lordship is to determine, whether you would wish to survive it.

THE BRITISH OBSERVER.

IRISH SALARIES.

SIR,—I had, a few weeks past, the pleasure of reading an excellent letter in your Political Journal, upon the Irish civil officers receiving their salaries at par from the Irish Treasury. In the debate of last night (22d March), in Parliament, Lord A. Hamilton moved for an account of those *military* officers, who enjoyed the same extraordinary privilege. To this Mr. Corry assented, but expressed some surprise, that it was not included in a former motion. The fact is, that it was not *known*; for such has been the secresy with which this proceeding has been carried on, that until this year, no one in this country had any knowledge of the fact. When the subject was first agitated, the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed some astonishment, that any one should venture to question H. M. ministers upon a matter that had long escaped notice, and had been as long enjoyed.——He seemed to consider the Lords of the Treasury to have a right to put their hands into the public purse whenever they thought fit; and as they had contrived to pocket so much money without discovery, they had a just claim to *more*; and having done the same since the union, the antiquity of the practice, and the concealment of the fact, gave them a title to what they had appropriated. —— This mode of reasoning may be very satisfactory to the Lords of the Treasury of both countries, and to all the clerks of all the offices of the state; but, I trust, that it will not be approved of by the people.—— In this case, there is no security given to the public for the honest appropriation of public money; the same principle that induced these gentlemen to issue an *order* to pay themselves a sum beyond what they were entitled to enjoy, may, at another time, justify any act, which the hopes of private emolument may suggest.——If the upper and lower clerks of offices be to estimate how much their services are worth, the two countries will soon find Mr. Addington's *surplus* of revenue turn out to be a considerable deficiency.——But, Sir, I understand, that this practice is not confined to the Treasury: the Custom-house, &c. follow the same good example. Mr. Corry has at last confessed, that in *some* instances, military officers are paid at par. Is that, then, the whole truth? It is idle to say, "you did not ask for further information, and, therefore, we will not give it." The public have a right to be made thoroughly acquainted with the subject. Is it, or is it not true, that the Treasury are in the practice of obliging their *friends* with *gold*? And do not the clerks make a *trade* of it?——Besides, Sir, I hear from good authority, that, while the absentee officers of the Treasury, &c. &c. are paid at par, those who remain in Ireland pay themselves in *specie*. That is to say, the first making ten per cent. while the public in the same situation loses it, and the second, by the *sale of gold*, gaining at home nearly to the same amount, making the public a loser of ten per cent. upon the whole salaries of its servants; thereby reversing the order of things, which, in England, lays a tax on the servant, to refund part of his salary, while, in Ireland, the people are taxed by *private arrangement* to augment the pay of its servants.——Independent of these facts, now for the first time avowed and defended, and which, by-the-by, a court of justice would call by hard names, I wish to be informed, "how the public accounts are made out, and when any money due from England to Ireland is sent over, do the accomptants carry over the amount of the sums which the public gains by the exchange, and set it off against what the public loses by the augmented salaries of the Lords of the Treasury, &c.?" And secondly: what is the premium given by the private bankers to the agents of government, for the money due to the army, &c. in order to circulate private paper? This is a fact known to the government, *acknowledged by* them: why has it been permitted, and how long

has it been practised?——It appears to me, Sir, that the public are much indebted to Lord Archibald Hamilton for the discovery of this new mode of diverting the public money from public service to private emolument, and to Lord Henry Petty for the statement of one of the principal causes of the immense circulation of paper, and its consequent depreciation; being a bounty granted by another private regulation of the under officers of government to such circulation. These gentlemen, in short, appear to be willing to profit by the encouragement given by their superiors, and thinking that all is fair gain where money is concerned, have discovered in Ireland what we have long known here, that in the new order of things private advantage has become the business of the state.——I remain, Sir, with great respect, yours, H. T.

IRISH HALF-PAY OFFICERS.

Sir,—From the impartial manner in which your publication is conducted, I am induced to send you a remark or two, upon the motion of Lord A. Hamilton, for an account to be laid before the House of Commons, of the monies paid at par in this country, to officers holding *official* situations, on the Irish establishment.——As there had been some appearance of delay in the production of the required information, Lord Hamilton, on the 23d inst. renewed his application, and begged also to know if the system of paying at par extended to the *half-pay* officers on the Irish establishment. ——To this last question Mr. Corry, after he had accounted for the delay complained of, answered, "that, he thought Lord A. Hamilton's motion was confined to the *civil* officers of Ireland; and that it was necessary to acquaint him, that the officers on the half-pay of the Irish establishment, not being called to this country in consequence of the union, were on the same footing as before the union with respect to the receipt of pay."——I take it for granted, that the authority of the Lords of the Treasury has been obtained for the precedent of paying the salaries of the civil officers on the Irish establishment at par, and that this indulgence has been granted on account of their occasional residence in this country; but, Sir, I beg leave to remark, for the information of Mr. Corry, that numbers of meritorious and deserving officers, on the half-pay of the Irish government, are *also obliged* to reside in England with their families or relations; and that, at present, the miserable pittance of half-pay is so frittered away, by the difference of the currency, by the enormous rate of exchange, by the agency, and other incidental expenses, that a lieutenant will scarcely receive more than £30 per annum *sterling*, and this, too, as a reward, probably, for many years' services. Add to this disheartening representation the irregularity and uncertainty of its payment, even at this reduced rate. I know of some cases, and have heard of many others, wherein officers have not received any half-pay from government, since the reduction of their regiments in Ireland in June, 1802, although repeated applications have been made to obtain it.—— There can be no good reason, in my opinion, given, why there should be any difference between the half-pay of an officer from one regiment and that of another in the British service. Surely the being *accidentally* reduced in Ireland, cannot be justifiably admitted.——I hope, and trust, Sir, for the honour of this country, that the same liberality of sentiment, which induced their lordships of his Majesty's Treasury to have so much feeling and consideration for the officers in *high civil employments*, with salaries so munificent as those which, in general, they enjoy, will extend its influence to the comfort and satisfaction of those deserving military claimants, the half-pay officers on the Irish establishment.——I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. Miles.

DEFENCE OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,——In the Register of the 18th ult. is a letter signed Z., on naval affairs, which, I am much persuaded, did not come from an impartial hand. Nothing is more easy than to make general assertions of mismanagement against any board; but, there is some little difficulty in citing particular instances of it, accompanied by such necessary proofs as shall carry conviction home; unless, indeed, incapacity or neglect of duty have been manifested. That the assertions respecting the Dock-yards, in the said letter, originated in ignorance or malice, must immediately strike the reader, however little he may be acquainted with their actual state; but, by those who have opportunities of visiting them, and are in acquaintance with their officers, they are at once known to be unfounded. I assert, from personal knowledge, that the business of the Dock-yards never went on with more alacrity, cheerfulness, and economy, than since Lord St. Vincent has presided at the Admiralty Board; and, that instead of the officers being panic struck, slow in the execution of orders, and

fearful of losing their places, they are vigilantly alive to the exigency of the times, constantly in the honourable discharge of their duties, and looking up to the Admiralty Board with the fullest confidence of not only support, but promotion, when a case occurs in which they can claim it. This, Sir, although it has never been exhibited in your Register, is a true picture, as far as it goes, of the Dock-yards. With regard to the timber returned by the Dock-yard officers, very little need be said to prove, that if Z. has no better founded complaints to make against the Admiralty Board than this, he would do wisely by keeping them to himself. The contractor alluded to, was bound to supply timber of the description specified in his contract, and the Navy Board were bound to pay a certain price for it. If the timber delivered was not of this description, the officers did their duty in rejecting it; (I believe, Z. will not deny this,) but, if it was conformable to the contract, the contractor does not require to be told, that he had not only the power of compelling the officers to receive it, but by representing their conduct to the Navy Board, of teaching them a lesson that would have effectually prevented his being so served again. If the same kind of attention that is now bestowed on the receipt of stores at the Dock-yards, had obtained for the last ten years, it is easy to conceive, that the public would not have regretted it.——Z. very prudently declines entering on the subject of the blockade of Brest, lest he should increase his letter beyond the limits of the Register. You, as well as I, have reason to thank him for his consideration: you, because your Register is generally filled with matter more palatable with the public; and I, because he has saved me the trouble of exposing more of his folly. He also restricts himself in his observations on "the parsimonious system which is pur-"sued with regard to our naval hospitals, "and to the surgical establishment of the "fleet." Having lately had it in my power to make inquiries on these points, I trust the result of them will not be uninteresting to you. If I were a warm partisan of Lord St. Vincent, I should feel great obligation to Z. for introducing the state of the naval hospitals as a subject of complaint, as certainly no part of his public duty has been attended to with more effect, than the comfortable accommodation of the sick of his Majesty's ships, whether on board or on shore. In the American war, when there were more than twelve hundred patients in Plymouth Hospital, there was only one physician and one surgeon: now there are two of each; with a third of that number of patients. At the same time, with more than two thousand patients, two physicians, and two surgeons were employed in Haslar Hospital: now three of each are there, with a tenth part of the number of patients. In the selection of medical and chirurgical officers for these hospitals, no regard has been shewn to powerful interest; professional ability alone has been their recommendation, and the knowledge of it must inspire those brave tars, whose maladies may induce a necessity for sending them thither, with the most perfect confidence in humane treatment and speedy cure. Instead, therefore, of its being probable that our worthy fellows should perish from the want of their wounds being dressed, it appears there are as many surgeons in our naval hospitals as the greatest possible number of patients they can accommodate, could require. Ample provision has also been made of assistant surgeons, in a case of emergency; but, there is no reason whatever to add to their number at present, unless throwing away the public money can be called one. It is admitted by all ranks of officers in the navy, that the King's ships were never better, perhaps, not so well, provided with surgeons, as at this moment; which is to be attributed to the judicious arrangements of the Sick and Wounded Board. Surgeons' mates ever were and ever will be scarce, till they are as well paid as in the army. But this is not the fault of Lord St. Vincent; he is liberally disposed to every part of the navy; and for none is he more anxious to procure encouragement than the surgeons, as none are really more deserving of it. The more completely to ensure the due performance of all the duties of the medical department of the navy, Lord St. Vincent thought it necessary to appoint an officer to inspect them; and to execute this arduous task, he nominated Doctor Baird, who had, as surgeon of the Ville de Paris, under his lordship's own eye, given earnest of what might be expected from him, when he should one day fill a more exalted station. What was then expected has been more than fulfilled. But at present, I wish to abstain from enumerating the various important and economical changes effected by him, for the public good, in his new appointment; as it is probable, they may soon meet the public eye through a more authentic channel. It never was the way of Lord St. Vincent, nor of those who have been indebted to him, to vaunt his public services; if it had, what volumes might have been filled, a tithe part of which, would be sufficient to immortalize a common man. At

the time Old England was shaken to its very centre, by the disgraceful mutiny that raged in our home fleets, (which, by your own acknowledgment, struck terror into your heart in America), what was the state of his lordship's fleet in the Mediterranean? it was in the most perfect state of discipline; if a symptom of mutiny or insubordination ever appeared, it was instantly crushed. The crew of one ship in the fleet, that had been tampered with by the crew of another that had lately joined, said "no, we will have nothing to do with mutiny, we love our King and country, we are well pleased with our captain and officers, and we glory in serving in a fleet commanded by the greatest admiral England ever produced." This affair, being the common talk of the fleet, reached the earl's ears, when he immediately ordered them a dollar a man, out of his own purse, for their loyalty. Thus, while he was a terror to the worthless, he was the father of those who faithfully served their country.

Portsmouth, March 24, 1804. Y.

DEFENCE OF THE CIVIL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.

SIR,—It is a duty which I owe to every person in the civil department of the navy, to endeavour to remove the unfavourable impression, which a speech lately delivered tends to make on the minds of the Public: I therefore hope from what I shall advance in refutation of such *extraordinary* assertions, to rescue the characters of many thousands of individuals from infamy, and likewise correct some observations made upon the occasion alluded to.——In the first place the speaker observed, as it is reported, "*that the persons who received payment for* "*ships built in merchants' yards were indi-* "*viduals belonging to the King's dock yards.*" In reply to this assertion, I can only say, that if the asperser was as conversant in the duty of a dock yard, as he is in the management of a theatre, he would see the fallacy and absurdity of such an argument. For when ships are to be built in private yards, the Navy Board contract with the merchants for that purpose, and when completed they are sent to be fitted for sea at the Royal Arsenals; the amount of building is directly paid by bill from the Navy Office, and, therefore, the people in the dock yards have nothing more to do, than to rig and put the stores on board for sea service. The gentleman is said to have further observed, "*that it was melancholy to be obliged to re-* "*sort to the merchants, when in the dock* "*yards there were* 3200 *men employed, doing* "*nothing more than the* MERE *repair of* "*ships.*" In answer to this observation, I shall briefly state, that, during the last war, there were nearly ten sail of the line launched in his Majesty's yards, most of them of the 1st and 2d class, together with several frigates; and our immense navy likewise kept in constant repair: and I can truly assert, that it requires nearly as much time to give a ship a thorough repair, as it does to build a new one. Without the assistance of the merchant builders, it will be impossible that our navy can be kept up, for I am well informed, that there are ships which have been ordered to be built for these last 3 or 4 years in the King's yards, have not yet their keels laid, some are standing in their frames, without any prospect of being finished, and others with a part of their timbers prepared, without any probability of being put together for some time to come. These delays are occasioned by the deficiency of shipwrights, and in some yards the want of timber. Yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer asserted, that there were only 58 wanting to complete the complement; the truth of which statement I have strong reason to disbelieve, for at some of the yards I am well informed (and I speak from good authority), that the shipwrights are now nearly 200 short of the establishment. Mr. Addington likewise said, that the number of men now in the dock yards, was greater than the first year of the last war: surely the relative situation of affairs should have been considered before that comparison was pleaded in extenuation. For previous to the breaking out of the last war we had had ten years of peace, a time sufficient to put our navy in a most respectable state, our ships were then in the best order: but this war commenced after a short interval of eighteen months, and that interval preceded by a long contest, a period never more trying for our ships; therefore, if it was expedient that 3000 shipwrights should be employed during the first year of the last war, double that number were not more than adequate to meet the exigencies of the first year of the present. And in answer to the minister, when he asserts, that 300 men were discharged as inefficient, and who had received pay for doing nothing: I have only to observe, that numbers of them *were* efficient, and capable of performing their duties in the situations in which they were placed; and I likewise assure him that many men whom the Admiralty discharged and superannuated as worn out in the service, were capable of doing a hard day's work, indeed many of them are now earning, in

other departments of the government, four or five shillings a day. Pray how were our immense fleets so expeditiously fitted out during the last war, when, according to Mr. Addington's statement, there were so many men in the yards paid for doing nothing? But in this instance I will appeal to the Public, whether they did not always speak in the highest terms of the great extent of our navy? A sufficient proof of the exertions which were then made.——With regard to the deficiency of stores, I must likewise observe, that at Portsmouth yard in December last, it was found necessary to discharge several pair of sawyers, because there was not timber sufficient to keep them employed. In adverting to the latter part of Mr. Sheridan's speech, where he asserts, "*that abuses* "*pervade every department of the dock-*" *yards*;" and likewise asks Mr. Pitt, "*if* "*he knew of the frauds which the Commis-*" *sioners of Naval Inquiry have found to* "*have been committed in every article with* "*which the yards were furnished?*' I will only reply to *such* statements, by recommending members to refer to the Commissioners themselves, they will then discover how grossly they are deceived. The only glaring instance of abuse which has been reported to the House, was the circumstance of the fraud practised by the two Hedges, in which the servants of government were no more involved (as far as relates to the criminality of it), than the *Receiver General of the Duchy of Cornwall* himself. Mr. Sheridan accused Mr. Wilberforce of "unparliamentary conduct in adducing an opinion not from official papers, not from regular documents, but from mere personal assertions of men who are saunter-"ing on shore, and unemployed!!" I will ask him how, and in what manner, he obtained his information? I will venture to declare, that there are no documents before the House which can possibly justify him in thus stigmatizing every person belonging to the dock yards. Surely it would be advisable that those gentlemen who have it in their power to ascertain the regular state of existing circumstances, were not to suffer themselves to be falsely impressed by the assertions of *some* men, who from *interested* motives, feel peculiar satisfaction in degrading the parties in question. It is cruel and unjust that the whole civil department of the navy should be stigmatized, because in their immense body, some dishonest men should have been incorporated with them. Where is the department, where, upon a scrutiny, corrupted characters are not to be found? For we know that to be immaculate is not in the nature of human affairs. Many speeches in and out of the House teem with insinuations tending to degrade all parties in the civil branch of the navy: certainly it is *impolitic* and *ungrateful*, to be continually depreciating a set of men, on whose exertions the preservation of the country in a great measure depends, for the innocent are blended with the guilty, and the whole indiscriminately condemned. I cannot conclude without observing, that had Mr. Pitt alluded to *gun-brigs* instead of *gun-boats* (for there is a vast difference between them), he would have rendered it out of the power of Sir Edward Pellew and others to have started any objection whatever. For the gun-brigs were vessels of a construction, which enabled them to encounter the difficulties and dangers of a voyage to the West-Indies, to which part of the world many were sent during the last war.—I am, Sir, your sincere well-wisher, X.

March 21, 1804.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.——The Russian fleet in the Black Sea is preparing to sail, with a number of transports: its ultimate destination is yet unknown; by some it is said that the troops are intended for Mecklenburgh or Denmark, and by others, that they are intended for the protection of Naples; and at Constantinople, it is said, that the Russian ambassador there, has lately made extensive contracts with different Greek and Arminian merchants, for large supplies of salt beef, pulse, and live cattle; and, that the fleet will stay a short time at that place, and thence will proceed to the Archipelago and Mediterranean.—This naval expedition, together with the recent movements of the Russian troops in Lithuania, Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia, has excited the vigilance and the suspicion of the court of Prussia; and the King has issued orders for all soldiers who are absent on furlough, to return immediately to their respective regiments.——Gen. St. Cyr, with a French army of thirty thousand men, is daily expected in the environs of Naples; and arrangements are making, in consequence, for removing his Sicilian Majesty to Palermo, where he is to be joined by the King of Sardinia.——It is said, that the Danish government has expressed considerable dissatisfaction on account of a Dutch squadron, consisting of five or six brigs, with a number of troops on board, having entered the port of Bergen, and made that harbour a point of rendezvous for the force intended for the invasion of England.

DOMESTIC.——His Majesty is now so far recovered, as that it is thought unnecessary, by his physicians, to continue the daily reports respecting the state of his disorder. The following are the bulletins which were excluded from the last sheet of the Register: on the 21st, "his Majesty continues to recover:" on the 22d, "his Majesty is so "much better, that, in our opinion, a little "time will perfect his recovery. And, on the same day, the Lord in Waiting issued the following notice, "Lord Sidney has orders "to say, that there will be no further "attendance at St. James's after to day." On the mornings of the 15th and 16th, his Majesty walked in the Queen's Garden; and at about noon, on those days, the Lord Chancellor had audiences of his Majesty: the Royal Family, who were not permitted to see the King, rode out during the time. On the 21st. the Lord Chancellor had another audience, and his Majesty signed several official papers; aad, on the 22d. both the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Addington, had audiences, and laid before him several papers for his signature.——Nothing of particular importance has occurred in Parliament during the last two weeks. In the House of Commons, on the 15th inst. Mr. Pitt brought forward his promised motion for an inquiry into the state of the naval defence of the kingdom; which, after much discussion, was negatived, 203 to 110: and on the 19th, a debate of some interest took place on the re-commitment of the new volunteer bill. On the 22d. an interesting debate took place, on the third reading of the new volunteer bill, which was then passed. Some conversations have also been held on the subject of the accounts laid before Parliament.—A meeting of the inhabitants of Kingston in Jamaica was held on the 31st of December last, to consider the conduct of the senate of that Island, and among other declarations, it was resolved that the zeal and firmness of the assembly in opposing the extraordinary demands of the British ministry for erecting barracks, paying troops, and for other purposes, merited the highest approbation of their constituents.

MILITARY.—The war in Ceylon continues to be unsuccessful, and the Candians have gained some further advantages over the British troops. After the fall of Baticola a general slaughter ensoed; and the recent victories of the natives have given rise to the most serious apprehensions for the safety of Jafnapatam. The late loss at Candy amounted to about six hundred and fifty men, including officers.——The war against the Mahrattas is, however, more promising, and the military operations against Scindea have had a favourable commencement. A detachment of the forces under the command of Major-Gen. Wellesley has lately taken the large fortified pettah of Ahmednuggar, which was carried by escalade, with great gallantry and spirit.——The French army in the Italian States amounts to thirty thousand men: the head-quarters are Tarento; and it extends along the coast of the Adriatic towards Naples. It has been apprehended, that they would take possession of the Neapolitan States, and preparations are making in the ports of Brindisi, Bari, and Otranto, for a maritime expedition, the destination of which is not known.——The Paris papers are silent upon the subject of the military preparations on the coast of the channel: it is said, however, that Augereau who visited the First Consul, immediately after the discovery of the conspiracy, has left the capital for Brest; that Kellerman is gone to Hanover in the room of Nansonty, and that Massena will be appointed successor of Mortier.——Gen. Marmont, attended by Vignoles and Boudet, has just been inspecting the troops at Utrecht, Amsterdam, and Flushing; and the Dutch troops in North Holland, are approaching the Helder for the purpose of embarkation.

NAVAL.—Another expedition, consisting of twelve ships of war, is preparing at Constantinople, and it is said, that its destination is the Morea, where he Porte is apprehensive of the encroachments of the French. ——The French fleet at Brest consists of two ships of 120 guns, five of 84, nine of 74, four of 44, three of 32, one of 24, and two of 20, besides four small cutters of from 8 to 16 guns, four bombs, and three fireships: there are also in the docks at that place one of 120 guns, two of 84, four of 74, and two of 44. In the dock at L'Orient one of 120 guns, two of 84, one of 32, and two cutters of 20 guns. The squadron at Rochefort consists of one ship of 120 guns, two of 84, two of 74, three of 44, and one of 24. ——An embargo has been imposed on all the shipping of Dublin, similar to that imposed on the shipping of London.—A part of the ships laden with stores has just sailed for Boulogne under convoy; and a considerable firing has since been heard off that place, but nothing has transpired relative to the success of the expedition.——On the 2d of January, Capt. Nourse in his Majesty's sloop Cyane, recaptured the Westmoreland Guineaman, which had been previously taken by the Gen. Enouf French privateer; and on the 20th, after a chase of five hours, he captured the French privateer La Bellone of eight guns, and eighty-four men, seven

days from Surinam.—On the 12th of March, Capt. Haywood, of his Majesty's sloop Harpy, captured the French gun-boat Penriche, of two guns, together with two small transports, which were part of a convoy proceeding under her protection from Calais to Boulogne.—Lieut. Milne of the armed cutter, Mary, has taken L'Enterprise, French vessel, of forty-four tons and four men, laden with wine and brandy; and the Rosalia of forty-three tons and four men, laden with flour: these vessels were part of a convoy bound to Brest. On the 9th of March, the letter of marque lugger, Tartar, captured the French brig, Juan Henry, of twelve twelve-pounders, and two four pounders, and fifty men.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The SUPPLEMENT to the IVth Volume of the Register being now completed and ready for delivery, I think it a proper occasion to notify some alterations, which have been adopted, with a view of accommodating the readers of the work, in general, and particularly those who live at a distance from the metropolis. Gentlemen thus situated have been put to great and numerous inconveniencies, as well as considerable expense, in obtaining the Supplements to each volume respectively; and, when it can be avoided, it appears unfair to subject them thereto, or to leave their volumes incomplete, which, according to the present arrangement, they must be if without Supplements, having neither Title Page, Table of Contents, nor Index, which form so necessary a part of the work, and which have hitherto been published in the Supplement. Nor has the delay, which necessarily occurs in the printing and delivery of the Supplement, been, by any means, a pleasant circumstance. When the half year is closed, gentlemen are naturally desirous to have their volumes completed and bound; which, as in the present instance, they cannot do till two or three months after the half year has expired. These reasons, together with several others of inferior weight, have made me determine to publish no more Supplements; but to print the Title Page, the Table of Contents, and the Indexes, in the last number of the Register of each volume or half year; and, then it will, of course, be transmitted to the subscribers, in every part of the kingdom and of the world, in the same expeditious manner that the other sheets are now conveyed. In order, however, that there may be room, without the exclusion of any other useful matter, for *all* state-papers, and other documents of public importance, I shall, as, indeed, I have done for some time past, publish about once a month, a double sheet; but, that the expense of the work may be fixed and known, there shall, invariably be *thirty-three* sheets in each half year, making the annual cost of the Register only £2 15s. nearly one pound of which goes to the Stamp-Office, a circumstance which I by no means regret.—The plan of a Supplement to each volume arose from my desire to give extensive circulation to a faithful report of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES; and, were there no other reason for discontinuing the Supplements, a sufficient one would be found in these Debates, which, from the length, as well as from the correctness and the perfect impartiality, with which they are reported, have now swelled to a size, and have acquired an importance, that forces them into a separate work; and, accordingly, they will be published as such, in *Numbers* during the session, and in a volume, or volumes, at the close; so that, henceforth, it will be entirely at the option of every person, to take both works, or either of them without the other.—The success which the Debates have met with is not, I believe, to be equalled in the history of any publication of the sort; but, indeed, this is by no means a matter of surprise, when the work is viewed in comparison with former publications bearing a similar title; and, as to *impartiality*, which was the great object of the undertaking, I hesitate not to defy the most acute observer, to point out one single instance, in the whole work, where, except from mere error, the most scrupulous impartiality has not been adhered to; in proof of which, I beg the reader to compare the ministerial speeches in this work with the reports of those speeches in any newspaper or other collection of Debates. In short, as I have long wished to see a work exhibiting a full and faithful record of the proceedings in the British Parliament, I have now spared no pains to accomplish that wish, and I can, with confidence, say, that as far as the present work has gone, it is accomplished.

The topics intended for the Summary and the letters of Correspondents are unavoidably deferred till my next.

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